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Turkey hosts almost 3.5M refugees and has to face a humanitarian emergency of unprece-
dented levels. We use mobile phone data to map the mobility patterns of both Turkish and
Syrian refugees, and use these patterns to build data-driven computational models for quan-
tifying the risk of epidemics spreading for measles - a disease having a satisfactory immu-
nization coverage in Turkey but not in Syria, due to the recent civil war - while accounting
for hypothetical policies to integrate the refugees with the Turkish population. Our results
provide quantitative evidence that policies to enhance social integration between refugees
and the hosting population would reduce the transmission potential of measles by almost
50%, preventing the onset of widespread large epidemics in the country. Our results suggest
that social segregation does not hamper but rather boosts potential outbreaks of measles to a
greater extent in Syrian refugees but also in Turkish citizens, although to a lesser extent. This
is due to the fact that the high immunization coverage of Turkish citizens can shield Syrian
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refugees from getting exposed to the infection and this in turn reduces potential sources of
infection and spillover of cases among Turkish citizens as well, in a virtuous cycle reminiscent
of herd immunity.
Introduction
Human migration represents a complex phenomenon influencing in several inter-connected ways
the economy, the healthcare and the social cohesion of whole countries 1–7. However, it is only
recently that the availability of massive datasets opened to new advancements in modelling and
understanding such complexity 8–11, addressing the urgent need for effective, large-scale interven-
tion policies towards managing the consequences of massive migration flows 5.
In our manuscript, we focus our attention on Turkey, a country facing a humanitarian emer-
gency of unprecedented levels 12. In the last eight years, more than 3.5M Syrians, displaced by the
war, have sought refuge in Turkey. This number, through births and new arrivals, is also increasing
by approximately 1,000 people per day. The arrival of a huge amount of people with different
economic, health, and living conditions, and from a country where the healthcare system has been
almost completely disrupted, may raise serious concerns about the risks of Turkish health systems
being overburdened.
For instance, Turkish infectious disease specialists are concerned that Syrian refugees’ crisis
may impose serious risks to their country for infectious diseases previously eliminated or in the
process of being eliminated 13. According to the latest reports from WHO and UNICEF 14, immu-
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nization coverage in Syria dropped from more than 80% before the war to a worrying 41% in 2015
for the most basic vaccines, resulting in millions of unvaccinated children. Direct consequences
of this alarming situation are a high risk of epidemic outbreaks (e.g., evidence for polio 15 and
measles 16 has been reported) and a potential increase of mortality due to diseases which could be
prevented with vaccines 17. Thus, countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, hosting a great
concentration of Syrians perceive the lack of an appropriate immunization coverage as a potential
risk of epidemic outbreaks for the local population 13. This perceived risk may ignite a cascade of
social dynamics which could: i) reinforce the segregation of refugees; ii) increase unemployment
and poverty; iii) result in difficult relationships between healthcare workers and Syrians.
The aim of this study is to quantify the risk of observing widespread measles epidemics in
Turkey, showing potential public health benefits coming from social integration between Syrian
refugees and Turkish citizens. To such aim we developed a transmission model to investigate
the influence of social mixing and integration among Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens on the
potential spread of measles epidemics in Turkey. The model takes explicitly into account em-
pirical mobility patterns, as inferred by mobile phone data 18, and the current level of immunity
against measles in the two considered populations, as estimated from available epidemiological
evidences 14, 19. Since the current amount of integration is difficult to estimate with available data,
measles transmission is modelled by considering a tunable parameter that accounts for a variety of
scenarios, ranging from full segregation to full integration. Results are obtained by simulating the
spread of measles by assuming different scenarios for measles transmission potential and different
levels of social integration.
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In particular, measles represents an illustrative case of a highly contagious infectious disease
which can be prevented with a safe and effective vaccine 17, 20–25. Despite substantial progress to-
wards measles elimination at the global level has been documented, re-emergence of large measles
epidemics was observed in the last decade both in low-income and in high-income countries 24.
Moreover, measles epidemiology varies widely across different geographical regions, as a con-
sequence of heterogeneous immunity gaps, generated by sub-optimal immunization activities, in
different socio-demographic settings 22–24.
The crucial role played by both human mobility 26–31 and mixing patterns 32–34 in shaping
the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases has been widely documented in the literature
and represents a key component of realistic modeling aimed at informing public health policies.
Thus, human mobility models have been used to map flows of individuals between geographi-
cal areas at different scales and to improve the reliability of transmission models of infectious
diseases 26–28, 35–38. In the last years, mobile phone data have been successfully used as a valuable
proxy for human mobility 10, 39–43. We capitalize on these works to build, from mobile phone data, a
multilayer network 44–46 map of human mobility of Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in Turkey,
and we use this knowledge to develop a computational model for the potential epidemic spread of
measles.
The contribution of our work is twofold. On the one hand, we identify the epidemic risks
associated with measles in Turkey. On the other hand, we investigate how these epidemic risks are
affected by policies devised to enhance social integration between Syrian and Turkish populations.
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Results
Immunity levels in the two populations. Two different immunity levels against measles infection
are estimated for the Turkish and the Syrian populations. As measles epidemics have not been
recently reported in Turkey, we assume the measles immunity level among Turkish citizen reflects
the fraction of immunized individuals among birth cohorts between 2006-2016 through 1st and 2nd
dose routine vaccination programs 14 (see Supplementary Methods). Accordingly, our estimates
suggest that only 3.8% of Turkish people might be currently susceptible to measles infection. A
different level of susceptibility in the Turkish population is also considered for sensitivity analysis
in the Supplementary Discussion.
Estimates of the immunity level among refugees was instead obtained by inferring the age-
specific fraction of susceptible individuals in Syria during a recent measles epidemic from the
growth rate and age-distribution of cases reported in 2017 19, and accounting for the age distribution
of Syrian refugees in Turkey 47 (Fig. 1). We found that the effective reproductive number (Re) of
the recent Syrian measles epidemic was 1.32 (95%CI 1.26–1.38). Consequently, we estimated that
the percentage of susceptible individuals in Syria at the beginning of 2017 was 8.92% (95%CI
7.29-10.96). The resulting percentage of susceptible individuals among Syrian refugees in Turkey
was estimated to be 9.87% (95%CI 8.07-12.18)(Fig. 1).
Obtained results suggest that nowadays, in Turkey, 280,000-430,000 out of 3.5M Syrian
refugees and about 3M out of 80M Turkish people are measles susceptible.
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Social integration, humanmobility and disease transmission. The risk of measles re-emergence
in Turkey is here analysed by using a compartmental transmission model explicitly taking into
account potential infectious contacts occurring between individuals moving across the country.
Different scenarios on how much Syrian refugees interact with Turkish citizens are investigated.
A schematic representation of the model is shown in Fig. 2A,B along with spatial mobility pat-
terns inferred by the analysis of Call Detailed Records (CDRs) associated with the usage of mobile
phones in the country.
The fundamental quantity regulating disease dynamics is the basic reproduction number
(R0), which represents the average number of secondary infections in a fully susceptible popu-
lation generated by a typical index case during the entire period of infectiousness. Larger R0,
higher the disease transmissibility. If R0 > 1 the infection will be able to spread in a population.
Otherwise, the infection will die out. For endemic diseases like measles, R0 provides insights into
the proportion p of immune population (either due to vaccination or natural infection) required
to prevent large outbreaks; the equation p = 1 − 1/R0 is widely accepted 20, 21, 48. For instance,
if R0 = 20 at least 95% of the population has to be immune to eliminate the disease. As for
measles, typical values of R0 ranges from 12 to 18 20–22, 25, 48. However, when considering diseases
with pre-existing levels of immunity (e.g. childhood diseases like measles), R0 is a theoretical
value representing what could happen in terms of disease transmissibility by removing immunity.
In these cases, an appropriate measure of diseases transmissibily is provided by the effective re-
production number (Re), which represents the average number of secondary infections in a partly
immunized population generated by a typical index case during the entire period of infectiousness.
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In Fig. 2C we show the ratio Re/R0 as obtained by varying the fraction of Syrian refugees
susceptible to measles from 8.07% to 12.18% and by varying the level of social integration from
0% (full segregation of refugees) to 100% (full integration of refugees). We found that pre-existing
levels of immunity of the two populations reduceRe to values lower than 10% ofR0. For example,
if R0 is lower than 10, the probability of observing an epidemic outbreak would be close to 0
because Re would result lower than 1 as a consequence of pre-existing immunity levels. However,
if R0 is in a more plausible range of values (e.g. 12-18), pre-existing levels of immunity, which are
particularly low among Syrian refugees, might not be sufficient to prevent the spread of the disease.
Moreover, we found that Re is maximum when the two populations live socially segregated from
each other, whereas it quickly decreases by almost 50% when the two populations are socially well
integrated.
In sum, the immunity level characterizing the Turkish population in 2017 is expected to pre-
vent the spread of future measles epidemic in geographical locations predominantly populated by
Turkish citizens. However, if a measles index case would occur in a population with a sufficiently
large proportion of Syrian people, transmission events will be sustained by the lack of adequate
immunity levels among refugees. Our modelling analysis show that for any scenario considered the
risk of observing large epidemics increases with the basic reproduction number and the proportion
of susceptible among the refugees (see Fig. 3 and Supplementary Information).
Measles epidemic risks in Turkey. In case of full segregation of refugees (although practically
infeasible and therefore unlikely), potential measles epidemics would result in dramatic health
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consequences among refugees, causing a huge amount of measles cases widespread in the country
(Fig. 3). Specifically, when R0 = 15 is considered and 9.8% of refugees are assumed to be
measles susceptible, the probability of observing an epidemic with more than 20 cases is 100%
(see Supplementary Discussion) and the final size of potential epidemics is expected to exceed
10,000 cases (mean estimate 10,662 95%CI 3,172–18,414, see Fig. 3). Our results show that the
risk of observing sustained transmission in the country is large for any value of R0 larger than 15
but also for lower values of R0 (e.g. R0 = 12) if the proportion of refugees susceptible is 9.8% or
more (see Fig. 3 and Supplementary Discussion).
In the case of full segregation, infections would occur only among refugees. However,
when assuming high level of segregation (i.e. only a small fraction, yet equal or greater than
10%, of refugees contacts occur with Turkish citizens), the risk of experiencing large measles out-
break is high (see Supplementary Discussion) and measles epidemics could produce non-negligible
spillover of cases among Turkish citizens as well (Fig. 3). In particular, in a worst case scenario
where R0 = 18, 12.18% of refugees are susceptible and more than 70% of Syrian contacts oc-
cur with Syrian people, thousands of measles cases are expected all over the country among the
Turkish people as well (see Fig. 3, 4).
More in general, obtained results suggest that the risk of observing sustained measles trans-
mission, the final size of potential epidemics and the populated area at risk of measles infection are
significantly smaller in the presence of high levels of integration of refugees (Fig. 3, 4). Specifi-
cally, when R0 = 15 is considered, 9.8% of refugees are assumed to be measles susceptible and
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refugees well mix with the Turkish (e.g. more than 70% of Syrian contacts occur with Turkish
people), the probability of observing epidemic outbreak dramatically decreases to values lower
than 10% (see Supplementary Discussion). Moreover, in case of outbreak, the expected overall
number of cases is no larger than few hundred (Fig. 3), as potentially infectious contacts would
more probably occur with Turkish immune individuals, who represent about 90% of individuals
currently leaving in Turkey.
Spatial diffusion of potential epidemics. Remarkably, larger segregation levels also promote the
spatial invasion of the epidemic across the whole country (Fig. 5). In the worst case scenario of
R0 = 18, 12.18% of Syrian refugees susceptible, and more than 90% of Syrian contacts occur
within the Syrian population, the measles epidemic is expected to affect more than 300 out of 1021
prefectures of Turkey (Fig. 5A). On the opposite, if more than 70% of contacts of refugees would
occur with Turkish people, as a consequence of good integration of refugees with Turkish citizens,
for the majority of epidemiological scenarios considered, measles epidemics are expected to re-
main geographically bounded in less than 10 prefectures of the country (Fig. 5 and Supplementary
Discussion).
Furthermore, our results suggest that the level of social integration between refugees and
the Turkish population can also strongly affect the spatio-temporal spread of potential measles
epidemics. Figure 5E-H shows for each prefecture the expected cumulative measles incidence
over time for different levels of social integration in the the worst case scenario. Obtained estimates
indicate that, in the case of full segregation, 57% of Turkish prefectures is expected to experience
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more than 10 measles cases after 30 weeks since the beginning of an epidemic. Such percentage
decreases to 11%, 1% and 0.4% when refugees contacts with Turkish citizens increases to 20%,
40% and 60% respectively. Interestingly, in case of full segregation, prefectures where cases of
infections are registered at earlier stages are mainly located in regions associated with the four
largest cities of Turkey (64%, see Figure 5E). In contrast, when 60% of refugees’ contacts occur
with Turkish citizens, a remarkable fraction of prefectures that would be affected the early phase of
a measles epidemic are close to the Syrian border (Figure 5H). This partially explains why social
integration can – during a potential measles epidemic – significantly reduce the spillover of cases
in the Turkish population.
Discussion
The widely accepted critical immunity threshold for measles elimination is 95% of immune indi-
viduals. According to our estimates, while Turkish citizens are mostly protected by high vaccine
uptake levels, Syrian refugees display a considerably larger fraction of individuals that is suscep-
tibile to the measles, as a consequence of the sub-optimal vaccination during the ongoing civil
war. More specifically, while the level of protection of the Turkish population against the disease
is nearly optimal (more than 96% of immune individuals), the protection of Syrian refugees is far
from being acceptable (only about 90% of immune individuals, though highly uncertain).
The strong difference in the immunity levels among the two populations may have deep
repercussions on the society perception towards the movement of Syrians within Turkey. As com-
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mon in Western countries hosting considerable amounts of migrants 49, Turkish citizens might
perceive the lower immunization coverage of Syrian refugees as a potential threat to national wel-
fare and health. This perception might be even worsened by the staggering numbers of Syrian
refugees registered in Turkey, 3.5M in 2018 18, 49. This well documented negative perception 50, 51
may trigger segregation mechanisms, aimed at reducing as much as possible interactions and con-
tacts between Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens.
The carried out analysis provides compelling evidence that social segregation does not ham-
per but rather boosts potential outbreaks of measles to a greater extent in Syrian refugees but
also in Turkish citizens, although to a lesser extent. The main result of the current study is the
quantitative evidence that social mixing among Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens can be highly
beneficial in drastically reducing the incidence and the strength of infection of measles. This is
due to the fact that the high immunization coverage of Turkish citizens can shield Syrian refugees
from getting exposed to the infection and this reduces potential sources of infection, in a virtuous
cycle reminiscent of herd immunity and well documented in many real-world social systems 17, 52.
Our quantitative model combines CDRs data with available epidemiological evidences to estimate
the spatial distribution, the immunity profile and the mobility patterns characterizing the two con-
sidered populations, allowing the investigation of spatio-temporal patterns of a potential measles
epidemic in Turkey.
Provided that a full homogeneous mixing of refugees and citizens could prove to be imprac-
ticable or rather difficult to achieve, there are several policies that could reduce social segregation.
11
For instance, designing specific housing policies for redistributing refugees across different neigh-
bourhoods of a given metropolitan area could avoid the creation of ghettos 5, while also increasing
the chances of social interactions between refugees and citizens in schools, shops, third places,
etc. Although the proposed analysis clearly shows that increasing social mixing between Syrian
refugees and Turkish citizens is expected to produce positive public health outcomes, social inte-
gration is also expected to provide major societal benefits such as the reduction of violent crimes,
economic and educational inequalities 53.
From a geographic perspective, our analysis confirmed that there are metropolitan areas that
are pivotal in diffusing the incidence of the disease over time. These areas are mainly prefectures of
Istanbul and Ankara and, unsurprisingly, include also many areas adjacent to the national borders
of Turkey with Syria. It is in these areas that the efforts for reducing social segregation should be
strategically focused. This poses a great challenge for the future, provided that recent reviews of
urban regeneration projects highlighted an important process of social segregation of minorities
and non-Turkish ethnicity particularly strong in large cities such as Istanbul 50. However, our
results also suggest that social integration would decrease the relevance of large Turkish cities in
promoting the spread of the infection. On the other hand, immunization campaigns targeting areas
characterized by a large amount of refugees with respect to the Turkish population, as it is the
case of many prefectures close to the Syrian border, might critically reduce the chances of measles
transmission and prevent the onset of widespread epidemics.
The performed analysis has several limitations that should be considered in interpreting the
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results. Estimates of immunity levels in Syrian refugees and in Turkish citizens should be consid-
ered cautiously as no recent serological surveys are available for the two populations. Immunity
levels are inferred from the analysis of vaccine coverage for Turkish citizens and from the analy-
sis of the 2016-2018 measles outbreak in Syria. This last analysis in particular might be affected
by under-reporting of cases 17, 25 and does not consider potential spatial heterogeneities that could
drastically affect estimates of the overall level of protection against the disease. Also, we assume
the same levels of immunity in all municipalities, thus neglecting spatial heterogeneities that may
be present as a consequence of different vaccine uptake across different regions 54. Moreover, no
data on mixing patterns (e.g. by age) are available for either Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens.
Consequently, the model neglects potential differences in measles transmissibility by age of in-
dividuals and, similarly, potential differences in measles transmissibility for Syrian refugees and
Turkish citizens (e.g. induced by different numbers of overall contacts). Finally, CDRs data used
in the proposed analysis are associated with only a fraction of the population. Although these data
may not perfectly reflect real movements occurring across all the prefectures in the country, they
provide valuable evidence to infer a fair approximation of human mobility in the country driving
the spatio-temporal spread of an epidemic.
All this considered, the analysis carried out represents a first attempt to quantify the risk of
measles outbreak in Turkey and provides striking evidence that, besides policies aimed at increas-
ing vaccination coverage among Syrian refugees, social integration of refugees within the Turkish
population might be an effective countermeasure.
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Figure 1: Measles immunity levels. A Reported number of measles disease cases over time,
during the 2016-2018 measles epidemics in Syria as recently reported by the World Heath Organi-
zation 19; red bars correspond to data points used to derive the Re as a function of the exponential
growth rate of the observed epidemic. B Obtained fit of the epidemic exponential growth between
September and February 2017 in Syria: red solid line represents the mean estimate, orange shaded
area represents 95%CI. C Observed distribution of measles cases across different ages during the
2016-2018 measles epidemics in Syria as recently reported by the World Heath Organization 19. D
Estimated age specific serological profile in Syria at the beginning of 2017: green bars represents
mean values, vertical black lines represent 95%CI. E Observed age distribution of Syrian refugees
in Turkey (light green) 47 compared with the population age distribution in Syria (dark green). F
Estimated percentage of susceptible individuals among Syrian refugees.
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Figure 2: Model structure, human mobility and transmission potential. A Schematic illustra-
tion of the model considered in this work. Each prefecture of Turkey is considered as a node of
a meta–population network of geographic patches. Two populations, namely Turkish and Syri-
ans, are encoded by different colors and move between patches following the inferred inter-patch
mobility pathways. Turkish and Syrian populations encode two different layers of a multilayer sys-
tem 44–46 where social dynamics and epidemics spreading happen simultaneously. B Mobility of
Syrian refugees (Top) and Turkish citizens (Bottom) between the prefectures of Turkey as inferred
from CDR. Different colors are used to indicate the number of individuals moving from a prefec-
ture to another. C Effective reproduction number for measles spreading according to our model,
rescaled by R0, as a function of the mixing parameter accounting for social integration between
Turkish and Refugees. Colored lines are associated with the estimated levels of susceptibility
among Syrian refugees.
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Figure 3: The potential burden of measles epidemics. Cumulative infections considering epi-
demics that exceed 20 cases in the entire population. Bars represent the average number of infec-
tions occurring among Syrian refugees (red) and Turkish citizens (blue) for the model projections
as a function of the mixing parameter, black lines represent 95%CI. Three different values of
R0 and Susceptibility levels among the Syrian refugees population (S
Ref
0 ) were considered. A
R0 = 18, S
Ref
0 = 8.07%. B as A but for S
Ref
0 = 9.87%. C as A but for S
Ref
0 = 12.15%. D as A
but for R0 = 15. E as B but for R0 = 15. F as C but for R0 = 15. G as A but for R0 = 12. H as
B but for R0 = 12. I as C but for R0 = 12.
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Figure 4: The potential spatial burden of epidemics. A shows the estimated cumulative in-
fections in the case of 20% of Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens considering the worst case
scenario in terms of R0 and immunity levels against measles infection among Syrian refugees.
Bubbles size are proportional to the average number of measles cases in the Turkish prefectures
per 10,000 individuals. Inset displays the Istanbul prefectures. B as A but for 40% of Syrian con-
tacts with Turkish citizens. C as A but for 60% of Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens. D as A
with respect to the Turkish population. E as B with respect to the Turkish population. F as C with
respect to the Turkish population.
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Figure 5: Spatio-temporal spread of potential epidemics. A shows the estimated number of
prefectures affected by the epidemic as a function of the mixing parameter in the worst case sce-
nario. Bars represent the average number of prefectures exceeding 20 cases among Syrian refugees
(red) and Turkish citizens (blue); black lines indicate the 95%CI. B Percentage of the simulated
epidemic that exceed 20 cases per prefecture in the case of 20% of Syrian contacts with Turkish
citizens. Red and blue bubbles refer to Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens respectively. C as
B but for 40% of Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens. D as B but for 60% of Syrian contacts
with Turkish citizens. E (Top) relative incidence over time considering both the populations per
prefecture in the case of total segregation. Prefectures are ranked in decreasing order at week 20.
(Bottom) Proportion of region affected in the initial phase of the epidemic considering the first 25
prefectures affected by more than 10 cases. Border refers to Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa,
Mardin and Sirnak regions. F as E in the case of 20% of Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens.
G as E in the case of 40% of Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens. H as E in the case of 60% of
Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens.
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Methods
The epidemic model used in the our study is an standard one based on three compartments, namely
Susceptible, Infected and Recovered (SIR). We refer to the Supplementary Information for details
about the model. Here, we provide information about the force of infection used in our model.
To model the mobility of Turkish and Syrian refugees, we assume two populations of in-
dividuals, namely population 1 of size N (1) and population 2 of size N (2), living in a territory
consisting of L distinct geographically patches (i.e., Turkish prefectures) accounting for N (1)k and
N
(2)
k individuals, k = 1, ..., L with
L∑
k=1
N
(1)
k = N
(1) and
L∑
k=1
N
(2)
k = N
(2).
The absolute number of individuals moving between patches is inferred from available Call
Detail Records as in Refs. 37, 55 and rescaled to adequately represent the volumes corresponding to
80M Turkish individuals and 3.5M Syrian refugees.
Let us indicate by c(p)ki (p = 1, 2) the elements of a matrix C
(p) encoding the number of
people belonging to population p travelling from patch k to patch i, and with α the fraction of
Syrian contacts with Turkish citizens. The force of infection for each population in the i–th patch
depends on the contribution of all patches in the country:
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λ
(1)
i (α,C
(1),C(2)) = β1
L∑
k=1
c(1)ki I
(1)
k
N
(1)
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endogenous
+αc
(2)
ki
I
(2)
k
N
(2)
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous
 (1)
λ
(2)
i (α,C
(1),C(2)) = β2
L∑
k=1
αc(1)ki I
(1)
k
N
(1)
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous
+ c
(2)
ki
I
(2)
k
N
(2)
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endogenous
 , (2)
where βp = β/P
(p)
i (α, c) is the transmission rate for population p and P
(p)
i (α, c) is an appropriate
normalization factor (such that all individuals have the same number of contacts, regardless of
geography and citizenship, see SI for further details). Each contribution consists of an endogenous
term, accounting for the infectivity due to individuals from the same population, and an exogeneous
term, accounting for the infectivity due to the other population. The interplay between mobility
and social integration is thus encoded in the force of infection for the two populations.
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